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power on the part of the government. Alloolh v. Afaryland,
4 Wheat.; The People v. New York, 2 Black 620; 2 Wall.
200; 3 Id. 573, and many other Federal judgments, assert the
right of taxation, even to the limit of destroying the business
or prohibiting indirectly the thing assessed. Fifidd v. /os,
16 Mich. 505; People v. Mayor, 4 Nt. Y. 425,426,427; Scovil
v. C/evdand 1 Ohio St., N, S. 126; Aaloy v. Harkefta, 11
Ohio St. 638; Reaves v. The Treasurer, 8 Id. 3,33; Armington
v. Barneit, 15 Vermont 749; Weister v. Bade, 52 Penn. St.
478, are but a small portion of the State decisions, which as-
sert in reference to their legislatures this unlimited and wholly
irresponsible power of taxation. The courts have no possi-
ble control over it. No matter how unjust or severe upon
particular interests and persons, unless the imposition is at
war with some special constitutional clause in reference to the
subject, the provisions relied on in this case have never been
held to authorize the interference of courts: Sedgwick on
Cons'titutional Law, 502, 509; and 7 Cush. 53, 82.
Whenever the government seeks the property of the citizen,
exercising the right of eminent domain, or by taxation in
any of its numerous forms, the processes for seizure and as-
sessment are, in the most plenary sense,.within the discretion
of the legislatures. It has been often said that the only cor-
rection for what is harsh and unjust is to be sought in the
nature of our institutions. Those who study this history are
not advocates for decreasing a power, without which no peo-
ple ever have been continuously protected and prosperous.
The bill must be dismissed.
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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
AcTIoN.
Gopmencement of-Discontinuance-Abatement.-For the pur-
,pose of avoiding the statute of limitations, the time of issuing the
writ is the commencement of the suit, if it is duly served and
returned within the time therein limited. For other purposes,
service of the writ is regarded as the commencement of the suit:
Kirby v. Jackson, 42 Vt.
In order to constitute the commencement and pendency of an
action, in any such sense that the pendency of a prior suit would
abate the latter, the service of the writ, in the latter suit, must
have been such as would call the defendant to answer to the second
suit, and if notice of the discontinuance of the former suit is given
the defendant beford service is completed, so as to require him to
answer the suit, the two suits are not pending at the same time,
and the first will not abate the second: Id.
Evidence that a copy of said writ, with an attachment of real
or personal property thereon, was left in the town clerk's offict',
for the purpose of attachment, before the notice of discontinuance
was given the defendant, is wholly immaterial, and was properly
rejected: Id.
The plaintiff is not required to show that he had good cause or
any cause for the discontinuance of the former suit: Id.
ADmIRALTY.
Maritime Lien-The law creates no maritime lien on a vesse
as security for the performance of a contract to transport a cargo,
unless some contract of affreightment has been made: The .Keokuk,
9 Wall.
Such a contract cannot be implied against a transportation com-
pany from the fact that a man has loaded a barge belonging to
the company, by means of his own men, without any knowledge
by the company of what he has done, and then delivered bills of
lading to the agent of a steamer of the line, the agent at the
moment being very much engaged with other matters, just before
the steamer, which it was expected by the shipper would tow the
barge, sets off; no sufficient statement being made by the shipper,
when so delivering the bills, what bills they are, and the agent
himself having no knowledge of what has been done in the par-
ticular case, nor of the contents of the bills: Id.
ATTORNEY.
Power of Court over-A court has power, on the ground of
self protection, outside of the common law and statutory doctrine
of contempt, to disbar an attorney who has shown himself unfit
to be one of its officers; and such unfitness may be caused not
only by moral delinquency, but by acts (here, a publication) cal-
culated and intended to injure the court : Exparte Biggs, 64 N. C.
If an attorney who is also an editor of a newspaper, and who in
his latter character writes an article in disparagement of the court,
be putunder a rule by such court, he mayby answer, raise thepoint,
whether a prima facie case has been made out against him and he
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
be called on to make a disavowal-but where, as here, he does
not take that course, but elects to disavow, the case does Dot pre-
sent the question, Whether an editorial written by one wne lb an
attorney as well as an editor, falls under general principles gov.
erning cases of misconduct by attorneys of the court: Id.
Where, in such a case, the respondent submitted to try himself,
and filed a disavowal in these words, "The respondent respect-
fully answers: That as an attorney and counselor in this court,
he has ever been respectful, both in his deportment and language,
to his Honor Judge E. W. Jones, and disavows having ever enter-
tained any intention of committing a contempt of the court, or any
purpose to destroy or impair its authority, or the respect due
thereto:" Held, that although (in the expression italicized) more
general than there was occasion for, the disavowal was sufficient
to excuse, if not acquit ; even although in a subsequent paragraph
the respondent insisted that the article was not libelous; that, by
becoming an attorney he had not lost his rights as an editor; that
the article was written in the latter character; and that it did not
transcend the limits of criticism upon public men, allowed to the
freedom of the press: Id.
BANKEaS.
Lien for Advances-Promissory Notos--Principal andA gent.
-Whenever a banker or broker has advanced money to his cus-
tomer, he has a lien on all the securities in his hands for the
amount of his general balance, unless such securities are held under
some special agreement: Miller v. F. and ff. Bank, 30 Md.
Where a promissory note, payable to order, is endorsed by the
payee without qualification, such endorsement imports property in
the holder; and, without notice to the contrary, a person who
receives it from such bolder, has a right to treat him as the bona
fide owner of the note, and is not bound to make inquiry whether
he holds it as agent or otherwise: Id.
D. M. & Co., sent tWo promissory notes, payable to their order
and endorsed generally by them, to J. L. & Co., bankers, for col-
lection. The latter sent them to their correspondents, the F. and
M. Bank, endorsed, "for collection." The amount of the notes
was collected by the bank and psssed to the credit of J. L. & Co.,
who subsequently failed, being at the time of their failure in-
debted to the bank on the general balance of accounts between
them. In an action by D. M. & Co., against the bank to recover
the amount collected on said notes, Held:
. 1. That the plaintiffs had a right to maintain an action against
the defendant, under the well established rule: "That whenever,
by express agreement between the parties, a sub-agent is to be
employed by the agent to receive money for the principal, or where
an authority to do so may fairly be implied from the usual course
of trade, or the nature of the transaction, the principal may treat
the sub-agent as his agent, and when he has received the money,
may recover it in an action for money had and received."
2. That the right of the defendant to retain the proceeds of the
ABSTRACTS OF RECEN DIU(N
notes in its hands to be applied in part extingaishraent of the Pe
eral balance remaining due on account by J. L. & Co., depended
on the question, was credit really given to J. . &. Co., on the
faith of these notes before the receipt of knowledge that they be.
longed to the plaintiffs ?
3. That if such credit were in fact given, it made no difference
whether it was in the form of advances of money, or balances on
account of mutual dealings between the parties, suffered to remain
undrawn for.
4. But if no such credit were in fact given, or if given, subse-
quent indemnity had been obtained in any way for any loss that
might have been occasioned thereby, the, plaintiffs were entitled
to recover the amount of the notes,. as so much money had and
received by the defendant to their use.
5. That unless some credit were given, or some risk or respon-
sibility incurred-upon the faith of the notes, the defendant would
not be allowed to retain the money, simply because it had passed
the amount to the credit of J. L. & Co., and they still owed a
balance on account: Id.
BILLS AND NOTEs.-See Bankers.
BANKRUPTCY.
-Appeal by the Assignee.-Where an appellant in the Supreme
Court cf the United States becomes bankrupt after his appeal
taken, his assignee in bankruptcy, upon the production of the deed
of assignment of the register in bankruptcy, duly certified by the
clerk of the proper court, may, on motion, be substitutkd as appel-
lant in the case: Hernd on v. Howard, 9 Wall.
CONFEDERATE NOTES.
Investmeit by Executor -Where executors collected the funds
of an'estate in Confederate money, in 1861, 1862, and up to Feb-
ruary,. 1863, for next of kin living in Tennessee, and the lat-
ter received such money without objection, until, in the progress
of the war, communication was cut off; and thereupon the execu-
tors invested it in Confederate certificates, State treasury notes, and
other securities, all of which failed by the results of the war:
Reid, that they had exhibited ordinary care in this respect, and
were not responsible for the loss: 'Ship v. Hettrick, 63 N. C., 329,
cited, distinguished and approved: Kobb v. Taylor, 64 N. C.
CONSTITUTIONAIL LAW.
Contrads by U. S. with Individuals.-Although upon the princi-
ples settled by the judgment of this court, Me ullough v. Mary-
land, Congress may constitutionally make or authorize contracts
With individuals or corporations for services to the government;
may grant aids- by money or land in preparation for and in the
iniperformance of such services; may make any stipulation and
conditions in-relation to such aids notcontraryto the Constitution,
and may exempt, in its discretion, the agencies employed in such
services from any State taxation which will really prevent or im-
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pede the performance of them; yet in' the absence of all legisla-
tion on the part of Corress to indicate that such an exemption
is deemed by it essential to the full performance of the party's
obligations to the government, the exemption cannot be applied
to the case of a corporation deriving its existence from State law,
exercising its franchise' under such law, and holding its property
within State jurisdiction and under State protection, only because
of the employment of the corporation in the service of the govern-
ment: Thompson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall.
The point decided in McCullough v. Maryland, do~s not establish
a broader doctrine, even if some of its reasoning may seem to do
so: Id.
COttPONS.
Suit by HIolder.-A holder of coupons which have been cut off
from the bond to which they were originally attached, may bring
suit on them, if they represent interest already due, notwithstand-
ing he be no longer holder of the bond to which they belonged.
He need not, if he declares properly, produce the bond: The City
v. Lamson, 9 Wall.
In suing on the coupons in such cases, it is proper enough to
recite the bonds in such general way as explains and brings into
view the relation which the coupons originally held to the bonds,
and in some respects still hold. The suit does not, by such recital,
become a suit upon the bond; it is still a suit on the coupons: Id.
A coupon, if of the ordinary sort, being but a repetition, as re-
spects each six months or other stated term, of the contract which
the bond itself makes on that subject, and but a device for the
convenience of the holder, a suit upon it is not barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, unless the time prescribed in the statute be
sufficient to bar also suit upon the bond: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Attachment in Hands of Garnishee-Proof of Ownership.-L as
the agent of the .ltna Life Insurance Company, kept an account
in the First National Bank of Baltimore in the name of the com-
pany, and made deposits to its credit and drew checks thereon from
time to time, under a power of attorney for. that purpose from the
company. J, having recovered a judgment against L, and suppos-
ing that a part of the money so deposited really belonged to L,
caused an attachment, by way of execution, to be laid in the hands of
the bank. The writ was served on the cashier, who, finding no
account on the books of the bank in the name of L, and considering
that the attachment could not affect the account of the insurance
company, pleaded nulla bona. Subsequently he received notice from
the counsel of J, that the attachment was intended to cover all
moneys and credits of L in the bank, either in his own name or as
agent, or trustee, or in the name of the iZtna Life Insurance Com-
pany: Held, 1. That J, under the attachment against L, could not
recover for any funds to the credit of the insurance company which
the bank had paid over to it after attachment laid, but before no
tice that such funds were designed to be affected by the writ.
37
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2. That the bank account kept by L in the name of the Etna
Life Insurance Company, of which he was agent, was admissible
in evidence, it being accompanied with a tender of further proof
to show that a portion of the money to the credit of the insurance
company in the account in fact belonged to L.
3. That no part of the funds in the bank which may have beep,
proved to belong to L could be regarded as the wages or hire ot
an employee in the hands of his employer, so as to be exempt
from attachment under section 36, article 10, of the code of public
general laws: . Bank= v. Jaggers, 31 Md.
Fraudulent Bepresentations-Attachment.-Where goods are
obtained on credit- by such false and fraudulent representations as
would vitiate the sale as against the vendee, the vendor may re-
claim them after attachment and before sale on execution, though
attached by creditors on debts contracted subsequent to such
fraudulent sale, and on the strength of the vendee's having a good
stock of goods in his store, and on no other inducement, a part of
which stoek was the goods obtained by said fraudulent represen-
tations: Field v. Stearns, 42 Vt.
EASEMENT.
Prescriptive Right-Adverse Possession.-Where the defendant,
owning a grist-mill and the grounds around it, had been accustomed
to use an open space upon the west side for mill purposes, mainly
for customers to pass to and from the mill, and finally sold the mill
and appurtenances, but no land west of the mill, it was Held, that
the grantee took no right of way over said open space, the mill
being otherwise accessible: Plimpton v. Converse, 42 Vt.
If there had been a right of way appurtenant to the mill over
the defendant's said land prior to his purchase of the mill, it ceased
to exist when the title of the mill and the land west of it were
united in the defendant; and it having been so extinguished, and
as the defendant retained the land west of the mill when he sold
the mill, the sale would not revive the easement: Id.
In absence of any proof or circumstances indicating the con-
trary, it may do to assume that the use of an easement is adverse
and under a claim of right, but where the nature of the use leaves
it doubtful, it is for the jury, and not the court, to say whether,
upon the proof and circumstances, the user has been under a claim
of right, and adverse: Id.
The primafacie presumption is, that a person's enjoyment of
his own land was an exercise of his right so to enjoy it, and if
another claim an easement thereon, the burden is on the latter t(,
show that the interruptions of the owner were consistent with the
latter's claim, and not on the owner to show they were inconsist-
ent with it: Id.
ESTOPPEL.
Title to Land.-When one makes a deed of land covenanting
that he is the owner, and subsequently acquires an outstanding and
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adverse title, his new acquisition enures to the grantee on the
principle of estoppel: Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall.
Where a person has bought land andpaid for it, the deed subse-
quently made in consequence does not confer a new title on him ;
but confirms the right which he had acquired before the deed was
made: Id.
EVmENOE.
Remedial Statute.-Where a statute gives a remedy to the party
aggrieved by action for the recovery of damages, although it gives
accumulative damages, in an action by such party tipon the statute,
the defendent is not entitled to the rule of evidence applicable to
criminal trials, which requires the case to be proved against the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt: Burnett v. Ward, 42 Vt.
So held in an action of trespass upon section 9 of chapter 104 of
the general statutes, which gives to the owner of sheep or lambs
which shall be worried, wounded or killed by a dog, a right to
recover in an action of trespass founded on the statute, double
damages and double costs of the owner or keeper of such dog,
whether the dog had been accustomed to worry, wound or kill
sheep or lambs, or not: Id.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.-See Confederate Notes.
Payment to Confederate Authorities.-During the late war, an
administrator, having in his hands Et distributive share belonging to
one of the next of kin, residing in Illinois, upon being called upon
by the District Court of the Confederate States to answer certain
interrogatories propounded for the purpose of finding whether he
had in hand any property liable to sequestration, without demur or
further requisition, paid over to the receiver such distributive share
five months before he settled up the estate: Held, that he did not
therein exhibit ordinary care, and therefore was still responsible to
the next of kin for such share: Stateto use of Misher v. Ritchey, 64
N. C
HIGHWAY.
Railroad-Obstructing Highways.-The damage resulting to an
individual in consequence of a railway company so constructing
their road across a highway as to make it impassable at the cross-
ing, does not constitute a claim against the company, where the
facts show no positive injury, but show a mere non-feasance. The
liability of the company for such a default is, under the statute, to
the town; and the liability of towns to individuals for such insuf-
ficiency of highway, does not differ from their liability for insuf-
ficiencies from other causes: Buck v. C. & P. R. R. Co., 42 Vt.
INFANT.
Deed of Affirmance.-The deed of an infant, purporting to con.
vey lands, operates to transmit the title, and is voidable only, not
void: Irvine v. irvine, 9 Wall.
Although it is not necessary to the affirmation of an infant's
voidable deed that there be an act of affirmance by him, after he
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comes of age, as solemn in character as the original act itself, still
mere acquiescence by him is not sufficient evidence of affirmance.
The ratification or affirmance must be of a clear and unequivocal
character, showing an intention to affirm the deed : Id.
Where the infant, having come of age and entered into partner-
ship with third persons, took a lease for his firm of one part of the
property which as an infant he had conveyed, from the person to
whom he bad so conveyed that part with other parts, the lease is
proper togo to the jury, on a suit by the infant for these otherparts
alone, to show an affirmance of his deed for the whole; and with
such evidence before the jury, a court rightly refused to charge
that the evidence showed no affirmance. Whether it did show an
affirmance or not was, with this lease before them, matter for the
jury to decide: Id.
INSURREOTIN.-See Confederate Notes-Executor.
Contract against Public Policy.-A contract made during the
recent war-a part of the consideration for which was the carry-
ing of the mail of the Confederate States by the defendants, can-
not now be enforced, being against the public policy of the gov-
ernment: Clemmons v. Hampton, 64 N. C.
Obiter, that the contract being void, property purchased by the
defendant in the course of it may be recovered, or damages had
for its conversion: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Mortgagor and Mortgagee-Release-Quit-claim Deed.-A
quit-claim deed of the leased premises from a lessor to a lessee
does not operate as a release of the rent which had accrued at
the date of such deed: Johnson v. Muzzy, 42 Vt.
The mere fact that a tenadt is a mortgagee after condition
broken, will not absolve him from the payment of the rent, he
giving no notice of an intention to terminate the relation of land.
lord and tenant existing between him and the mortgagor, and
doing nothing equivalent to giving such notice: Id.
A decree of foreclosure, in which the time of redemption is ex-
tended beyond the life of the lease, will not of itself operate as
such notice, or for any reason terminate the mortgagee's relation
as tenant to the mortgagor : Id.
LImITATIONS, STATUTE op.-See Action.
Offer by Attorney to Compromise.-An offer, by the defendant's
attorney, to settle the claim on which the suit was brought, if the
plaintiffs would take fifty cents in the dollar, the offer having been
made on his own behalf; without authority from the defendant, and
not afterward ratified by him, is insufficient to take the case out
or the operation of the statute of limitations: Morris v. lHazle-
hurst, 30 Md.
Lis PNDENs.-See Action.
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MERGE*.
Equity-Intention of Parties.-When a mortgagee acquires
the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property, it does not
follow as necessary consequence that the mortgage becomes merged
and extinguished. A person becoming entitled to an estate, sub-
ject to a charge for his own benefit, may, if he elect so to do, and
manifest such election, take the estate and keep up the charge:
Polk v. Reynolds, 31 Md.
A court of equity will sometimes hold a charge extinguished
when, by the strict rules governing the subject at law, it would be
regarded as subsisting; and sometimes preserve it, where at law it
would be merged; the question being as to the intention, actual or
presumed, of the person in whom the interests are united, founded
upon the reason or necessity of the case: Id.
MISNOMER.
Effect of not Pleading.-Where a party is sued by a wrong
name, and the writ is served on the party intended to be sued, and
he fails to appear and plead the misnomer in abatement, and suffers
judgment to be obtained by default against him in the erroneous
name, he is concluded, and execution may be issued on the judg-
ment in that name and levied upon the property and effects of the
real defendant: Bank of Baltimore, Garnishee v. Jaggers, 31 Md.
NEGLIGENCE.
Destruction of Whisky during the War.-Destruction of whisky
by a provost-marshal, under the authority of the Confederate States,
in 1862, cannot be claimed as the act of a public enemy, by a rail-
road company situated within the limits of that government, and
recognizing its control: Patterson v. N C. B. B., 64 N. C.
Leaving leaking barrels of whisky, for a day and night, in a
car whose doors were nailed up, standing upon the track in a village,
at that time a military post, was gross negligence, and rendered
the railroad company responsible for its destruction by the provost-
marshal under his authority in matters of police: Id.
OFrICR.
Mandamus.-A judgment in mandamus ordering the perform-
ance of an official duty against an officer, as if yet in office, when in
fact he had gone out after service of the writ, and before the judg-
ment, is void. Such a judgment cannot be executed against his
successor: The Secretary v. HcGarrahan, 9 Wall.
Mandamus to compel either the Commissioner of the General
Land Office or the Secretary of the Interior to issue a patent,
cannot be sustained under statutes as now existing: Id.
SET-OFF.
Unliquidated Damages-Jurisdiction.-An unliquidated and
uncertain claim for damages cannot be set off against a judg-
ment. In equity, as at law, a set-off is only allowed where there
is mutuality in the demands, and the amounts are certain and de-
termined: Smith v. Washinglon Gaslight Co., 31 Md.
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Where a Plaintiff, located and doing business in the city of Wash-
lngton, recovers a judgment in the Superior Court of Baltimore
city, and the defendant has a claim for damages growing out of
the same transaction, the mere fact that the plaintiff is a non-resi-
dent does not give a court of equity in Baltimore jurisdiction to
restrain the judgment against the defendant, and to enforce a
set-off: Id.
Mutual debts--Assignment by one Debtor.-W-here two persons
hold debts against each other-in the absence of any understand-
ing between them, that the one debt shall be applied to the other,
there is no lien or equity to prevent one party from making an
honest assignment Qf his claim, even if thereby the other is pre-
vented from recovering his. This is so, even in cases of entire
mutuality of debt: Mc Connaughey v. Chambers, 64 N. C.
Where there was not such entire mutuality, and A had assigned-
his note without endorsement to a trustee to pay debts, and after-
ward, judgments were obtained upon both notes: Held, that there
was nothing in the relation of the original parties, at the time of
the assignment, which gave B a right to claim that the trustee
took A's note, subject to off-set by his: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIED STATES.
Error to State Court.-No writ of error to a State court can
issue without allowance, either by the proper judge of the State
court or by a judge of this court, after examination of the record,
in order to see whether any question cognizable here on appeal was
made and decided in the proper court of the State, and whether
the case, upon the face of the record, will justify the allowance of
the writ, and this is to be considered as the settled construction of
the Judiciary Act on this subject. Writ dismissed accordingly:
Gleason v. Hlorida, 9 Wall.
Whether in any case the affidavit of a party to the record can be
used as evidence of the fact of such allowance doubted. And the
affidavit of such a party refused in a case where the court thought
it highly probable that he was mistaken in his recollection: Id.
Bight of Appeal from State Court.-Where the State court in
which a judgment in a suit is given is the highest court of law or
equity in the State in which a decision in that suit can be had, a
right of review exists here under the 25th section of the Judiciary
Act (if the case be otherwise one for review here under that
section), although that court may not be actually the highest court
of law or equity in the State: Downham v. Alexandria, 9 Wall.
TAx SALE.
Prn,f of Title Undr.-A tax sale is not a judicial sale, and
the presumptions of law. in favor of the latter are not extended :o
it: tty v. fason, 30 Md.
It is incumbent upon the purchaser of land, at a sale by a colle.-
tor of axes, to give proof in support of his title, that all the requi-
sites of the law subjecting it to be sold for taxes, have been complied
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with. Each one of them forms a necessary link in the chain of
title, and if any one of them is wanting, its continuity is broken,
and the title cannot be upheld: Id.
TRESPASS.
Military Officers Taking Private Property.-Military officers
charged with a particular duty, may take private property for
public use without making themselves trespassers, but in such cases
the necessity must be urgent, such as will not admit of delay and
where action upon the part of civil authority in providing for the
want will be too late: Bryan v. Walker, 64 N. C,
The burden of proving such exigency in case of suit devolves
upon the defendants: Therefore, where all that the case showed
was, that a wagon and two mules of the plaintiff had been seized
in January, 1863, in Wilkes county, by the defendant, command-
ing a detachment of confederate troops, under the parol orders of
a brigadier-general, for the transportation service of the detach-
ment, and nothing appeared as to the exigency of the necessity (if
any) for such service: Held, that the defendants had not made
out a defense: Id.
The State "Amnesty Act" of 1866 does not include cases of
civil remedy for private injuries, unless (sect. 4) when the injury
occurred under some law, or authority purporting to be a law of
the State, which the parol orders here could not pretend to be: Id.
Quere as to the power of the State to pass such an act in regard
to civil remedies for injuries ? Id.
Title in Plaintiff.-In an action of trespass for cutting timber
from off vacant land, the plaintiff must prove a good title in him-
elf: Yahhoola River and C. Creek Mining Co. v. lrby, 89 or 40 Ga.
In showing title by an administrator's deed, the order of the
ordinary granting leave to sell must be produced. It is not
sufficient that it is recited in the deed: Id.
In an action of trespass for cutting timber on vacant land,
when it is proven that the defendant in good faith believed it was
his own land, the verdict, if for the plaintiff, ought to be only for
the actual damages proven: Id.
TROVER.
Conversion.-A knew, or had good reason to believe, that B
had certain cattle in his possession wrongfully, and was not the
rightful owner thereof, and co-operated with C by advising him
and furnishing him means for the purpose, and with the intent of
having C purchase and kill them, and thus put them beyond the
reach of the rightful owner, and C was thereby induced to and did
buy, slaughter and dispose of them: Held, that A was liable in
trover to the rightful owner: Moore v. Eldred, 42 Vt.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Lien for Purchase-Money.-Prinafacie, a vendor's lien exists in
all cases of sales of real estate for the unpaid purchase-money, as
against the vendee, and those claiming under him with notice; but
